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Abstract 
Across Europe and North America, governments responded to the financial crisis 
of 2007-8 by taking on the debt of banks and insurance companies. Subsequent 
austerity programs to reduce that debt have cut the living standards of all but the 
richest. Yet governments insist cuts are necessary and that they are fairly 
distributed. In this review of austerity policies in the UK, these claims are 
challenged, first by assessing the impact on key population groups of cuts in 
welfare spending and second by showing how specific reforms, including those 
planned before the financial crash, are likely to affect current and future 
pensioners, especially women and those living on low incomes. Finally, I review 
the effectiveness of austerity policies in tackling the deficit, outlining alternative 
policies that have been put forward by critics. I conclude that the cuts are not only 
unfair, exacerbating the social division between the very wealthy and the rest of 
society but are also counterproductive to the aim of restoring economic activity 
and reducing the deficit. 
Keywords: austerity, age, pensions, welfare state, banking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2013 Hipatia Press 
ISSN: 2014-6728 
DOI: 10.4471/rasp.2013.02 
 
RASP – Research on Ageing and Social Policy Vol. 1 No. 1 
July 2013 pp. 28-53 
 
Austeridad y Desigualdad. 
Evaluación del Impacto 
de los Recortes en Reino Unido 
por Género y Edad 
 
Jay Ginn 
King’s College London 
 
Resumen 
En Europa y en Norte América, los gobiernos han respondido a la crisis 
financiera de 2007-8 asumiendo la deuda de los bancos y de las compañías de 
seguros. Los consecuentes programas de austeridad para reducir esa deuda han 
recortado los niveles de vida de todas las personas excepto de las más ricas. Los 
gobiernos insisten en que los recortes son necesarios y están distribuidos 
justamente. En esta revisión de las políticas de austeridad en UK, estas 
pretensiones son desafiadas, en primer lugar, valorando el impacto de los recortes 
del gasto social sobre algunos grupos de población clave y, en segundo lugar, 
mostrando cómo ciertas reformas específicas, incluso aquéllas proyectadas con 
anterioridad a la crisis financiera, tienden a afectar a las y los pensionistas 
actuales y futuros, especialmente a las mujeres y a las personas con ingresos más 
bajos. Finalmente, reviso la efectividad de las políticas de austeridad que 
pretenden hacer frente al déficit, y esbozo políticas alternativas que han sido 
propuestas por algunos críticos. Concluyo que los recortes no sólo son injustos, 
ya que empeoran la división social entre los muy ricos y el resto de la sociedad, 
sino también contraproducentes de cara al objetivo de recuperar la actividad 
económica y reducir el déficit. 
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he boom created by lending policies of most western banks led 
to the most serious economic crisis since the 1930s. As banks 
and insurance companies faced insolvency and share values 
collapsed, most governments prioritised supporting these institutions, 
borrowing on global capital markets to do so and plunging their 
economies into debt and on-going recession affecting global trade. When 
public sector jobs, wages and pensions were cut, recession deepened and 
tax revenue fell, shrinking economies even further in a downward spiral 
(Irvin et al., 2009, figure 2; Boyer, 2012; Krugman, 2013). 
In the UK, cuts in social security programmes, in grants to local 
authorities to provide social care services, in jobs, wages, pensions and 
benefits in the public sector, and gradual privatisation of National Health 
Service hospitals have all been justified as necessary to reduce the annual 
fiscal deficit –the gap between tax revenue and government spending 
(Irvin et al., 2009; PCS, 2011; Reed & Lawson, 2011; TUC, 2012). Yet 
nearly five years after the financial crisis, the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition government’s austerity programme has failed to 
achieve the promised deficit reduction. Instead, unemployment has risen 
substantially and GDP has flatlined but the government’s response is to 
squeeze the population’s living standards even further, despite continuing 
military spending and condoning, despite much hand-wringing, the 
excessive remuneration to top earners and widespread tax avoidance and 
evasion. The opposition Labour Party has timidly advocated slower and 
shallower cuts. Thus, no major political party has been prepared to 
contest the principle of austerity. In the next section, I show how the 
effects of cuts announced in 2010 are expected to affect the living 
standards of different family types. 
 
Impact of Austerity Measures on Different Family Types 
 
The Coalition government has focused on reducing spending on the 
public sector, claiming (against the evidence, so far) that the private 
sector of industry would fill the gap by creating new jobs and services. 
Research based on use of various services and average receipt of benefits 
by each family type was used to estimate the relative change in their 
living standards resulting from planned spending cuts (Women’s Budget 
Group, 2010; Horton & Reed, 2010). While all groups lose to some 
T 
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extent, the greatest loss is for lone parents, among whom over 90 per cent 
are women, while lone women pensioners are the next most 
disadvantaged by the cuts (see Table 1). For pensioners, the projected 
loss is mainly due to reductions in Local Authority (LA) social care 
services, following a cut in government grant of 7 per cent per annum for 
four years from 2010. Disabled older people are the main users of these 
services as we discuss below. Thus it is vulnerable groups across the age 
range, from young to old, that bear the brunt of the cuts.  
 
 
Table 1 
Estimated change in living standards due to welfare cuts, by family type, 
UK 2010 
  
Family type Income loss, as % net average annual 
income 
Couple, childless 4 
Couple, with children 8 
Single, childless 7 
Lone parent 18 
Couple, pensioners 6 
Single, male pensioner  10 
Single, female pensioner  12 
 
Source: Calculations by S. Himmelweit using data supplied by Howard 
Reed as used in WBG (2010) and Horton & Reed (2010).  
 
 
 
Shrinking the UK Public Sector. Impact on Women 
and Older People 
 
By 2014-5, a total of £14.9 billion worth of cuts will have been made to 
benefits, tax credits, pay and pensions, with 75 per cent of this taken 
from women (House of Commons Library, 2012). In addition, cuts in 
public sector services, such as education, healthcare and personal social 
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services, which disproportionately affect women as users, are a major 
element of the austerity programme. Job losses in the public sector, 
estimated by the Office for Budget Responsibility as 500,000, as well as 
a wage freeze and reduced pensions, also affect women badly, since they 
comprise 65 per cent of the public sector workforce. Nationally, nearly 
40 per cent of UK women’s jobs are in the public sector, compared with 
about 15 per cent of men’s. ‘Sure Start’ centres for children from low 
income families are facing closure, leading to loss of women’s jobs and 
also of childcare options. Proposed cuts to legal aid and to refuges for 
women subject to domestic violence (often those living in poverty) 
threaten women’s safety by making it harder for them to leave abusive 
relationships with their children. While unemployment rises, eligibility 
conditions for some social security benefits have been tightened and the 
payments reduced. Housing Benefits, where 53 per cent of recipients are 
lone mothers, are being restricted. Child Benefit has been frozen for 3 
years, effectively cutting its value permanently. The ‘health in 
pregnancy’ grant has ended and the Sure Start maternity grant has been 
restricted. Funding for childcare –essential for women in employment - is 
being cut, putting more pressure on relatives such as grandmothers to 
provide unpaid care. Increased fares on public transport, due to cuts in 
subsidies, will affect mainly women, since more of them depend on it. In 
education, too, it is the women-dominated humanities courses that bear 
the bulk of the cuts. University crèches and nurseries are being closed or 
hours reduced, affecting nursery workers’ jobs and disadvantaging 
women students. Such cuts have long-lasting consequences. As 
demonstrating students have put it on their placards ‘Education cuts 
never heal’. Public service cuts affect people at all stages of the 
lifecourse. Many National Health Service (NHS) hospitals are being 
closed, merged or stripped down to a basic level, due to having debts 
they cannot repay. These are the legacy of government encouragement to 
hospitals, over several decades, to take on expensive loans from Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes (Pollock et al., 2002). Hospital closures 
and mergers not only cause job losses among nursing and other 
healthcare staff but also jeopardise the health of those in need. 
Contentious legislative reforms since 2010, strongly resisted by the 
nursing and medical professions as well as large sections of the public, 
are undermining the founding principles of the NHS. The changes are 
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likely to increase opportunities for large private healthcare corporations 
to ‘cream-skim’ the most profitable –but still tax-funded– health services. 
In this unfolding scenario, treating people with acute conditions is likely 
to have priority over treating those with chronic, complex and often 
multiple health conditions (Leys & Player, 2011). Opposition to the 
creeping privatisation of the NHS, including local campaigns to save 
hospitals, is met with the excuse that the national deficit must be reduced. 
Again, it is the most vulnerable whose care will be threatened by the 
changes. 
A significant proportion of older people have chronic conditions that 
limit their activity. Disability, measured as Limitations on Activities of 
Daily Living (LADL), affects 40 per cent of those aged 60 and 75 per 
cent of those aged over 80; the disability is severe for 20 per cent of 
those aged 60 and 50 per cent of those aged over 80 (Banks et al., 2010, 
p. 260-1). Where help is required with daily tasks, including personal 
care, family members, especially spouses, provide much of this informal 
care. Disabled older people who live alone (mainly women) rely on 
social care provided or commissioned by local authorities (LAs) in order 
to maintain independent living in their own homes. But they face 
reductions in supportive home care services that are already inadequate. 
Due to government cuts in grants, many LAs can only provide help to the 
most severely disabled, while means-tested charges for services are also 
increasing. LA provision of sheltered housing and financial support for 
those living in institutional care homes will also be cut. Overall, state 
spending on care and support for older people is expected to be £250 
million pa lower in real terms in 2014 than in 2004, despite numbers of 
older people rising by two-thirds (Glendinning, 2008).  
 
Cuts in Older People’s Pensions and Benefits 
 
Pensioners in the UK are diverse, with inequalities of income according 
to gender, ethnicity and previous occupational class (Ginn, 2003). 
According to international research, 28 per cent of UK men and 33 per 
cent of women over 65 lived below the official OECD poverty line in 
2007 (Zaidi, 2010). State pensions are ‘among the least generous in the 
developed world’ (Pensions Commission, 2005). The average weekly 
basic pension for women in 2010 was £70, for men £84; while the 
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average weekly amount of the earnings-related second state pension was 
£16 for women, £29 for men. Women on average received 76 per cent of 
men’s amount for the combined state pensions (Daily Telegraph, 2010). 
Even UK men’s average total weekly state pension in 2010 (£112) was 
far less than the Dutch Citizen’s Pension (AOW) in 2006 (£138). About 
half of pensioners are eligible for means-tested social assistance, but this 
is complex and stigmatised, so that only 68 per cent of eligible 
households claim (NAO, 2011). The benefit thus fails to reach almost 2 
million of the poorest pensioners. Austerity measures will have most 
impact on the poorest among older people, mainly women since they lack 
private means to compensate for cuts in state services, pensions and 
benefits. 
Winter Fuel Payment. Some 3 million pensioners live in fuel poverty, 
spending over 10 per cent of their income on domestic energy bills. 
Pensioners spent an average 30 per cent of their income on food, 
domestic fuel and clothing in 2004-8. The poorest fifth, likely to live in 
the least energy-efficient housing, spent nearly half their income on these 
essentials (Banks et al., 2010, p. 101). Many face a choice whether to 
heat their homes or spend money on food –dubbed by campaigners the 
‘HEAT or EAT’ dilemma. Older people need to heat their homes for 
longer than do people out at work, and those with limited mobility need a 
higher temperature in their home. Every winter over 20,000 pensioners 
die of cold-related illnesses. The annual Winter Fuel Payment (WFP), 
paid in December each year to pensioner households, was intended to 
prevent this by enabling pensioners to keep warm. The WFP originally 
covered a third of the average pensioner heating bill but between 2004-
12, the average energy bill has more than doubled, across all households. 
The WFP now pays only a fifth of the average pensioner household’s 
heating bill. Far from raising the WFP to restore its effectiveness, in 2011 
the government cut it from £300 to £200 per household aged 65-75, and 
from £400 to £250 for those aged over 80. This increases the risk to older 
people’s health from cold and malnutrition.  
Housing Benefit. One third of older people rent their homes, either 
from a Local Authority, Housing Association or private landlord. 
Housing Benefit was designed to make rents affordable for those of any 
age with low household income, since UK rents have risen dramatically 
to reflect rising house prices, but its value is now being restricted while 
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rents are still rising. This forces low income older (and younger) people 
to move away from their local social network of friends and family, 
risking increased isolation and loneliness.   
Reduced indexation of pensions. Following a long campaign by the 
National Pensioners Convention, state pensions from 2010 were indexed 
to the Retail Price Index (RPI) the growth in average earnings or 2.5 per 
cent, whichever is the higher. However, this success was short-lived; in 
2011, the government replaced the RPI by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) which is on average 1 per cent less. With national average wages 
kept low, it is the CPI that applies. Use of CPI indexation means that 
both state and most occupational pensions will lose purchasing power 
over time, so that pensioners’ living standards fall as they age. For 
example, a pensioner with an income of £10,000 pa will lose £800 over 5 
years compared with when RPI was the index (Towers Watson, 2010). 
Even the RPI was an inadequate index for older people, especially the 
oldest old, since the rise in cost of living is higher than RPI when a 
disproportionate share of income is required for fuel and food. From 
January 2006 to August 2008 (32 months) the rise in cost of living was 
5.4 per cent for non-pensioners, 6.6 per cent for young pensioners aged 
60-64, 7.8 per cent for those aged 75-9 and 8.4 percent for those aged 
over 80 (Leicester et al., 2008). The difference according to age group is 
partly explained by the association of higher than average inflation with 
low income and by increasing prevalence of solo living with advancing 
age (IFS, 2009). Pensioners who live longest, mainly women, will 
experience the greatest fall in buying power. Women pensioners’ average 
income is already only 57 per cent of men’s, mainly due to their lesser 
chance of having any private (occupational or personal) pensions and 
lower amounts among those who have this source of income (Arber & 
Ginn, 2004). 
Monetary and fiscal policies. The policy of maintaining near-zero 
interest rates (while inflation has ranged from 2 to 5 per cent since 2008) 
affects around 5 million older people who rely on a modest income from 
lifetime savings to supplement a small pension. Among older women in 
their 60s, median savings (among those who had any) were £8,000, 
which at 3 per cent per annum would generate £4 per week; however 
near-zero interest rates will reduce the median weekly income from this 
source to the price of a loaf of bread. The number of individuals aged 
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over 65 becoming insolvent rose from 2,725 in 2006 to 5,749 in 2011. 
This surge in insolvency is faster than for any other age group (Wilkins 
Kennedy, 2012). The impact of low interest rates on annuities for new 
pensioners is equally dramatic. When workers retire and use their 
pension fund to buy an annual income, the amount depends on the 
prevailing rate. This has fallen from 15 per cent in 1990 to a historic low 
of 5.6 per cent in 2012 and is still declining. For those older people liable 
to pay income tax, the age-related personal tax allowances have been 
frozen instead of rising with the cost of living. Each year the amount of 
tax payable will rise, leaving reduced disposable income. 
Thus, far from being protected from the cuts, older people face a 
number of reductions to services, pensions and benefits. In principle, 
pensioners could boost income from employment, although for the nearly 
half who are eligible for means tested benefits most of the increase would 
be clawed back by withdrawal of benefits. With poor job opportunities, 
age discrimination and a substantial proportion of pensioners having 
disabilities or caring responsibilities, it is not surprising that only 11 per 
cent of men over 65 were employed and 5.3 per cent of women, mainly 
part time (PPI, 2012). I next turn to future pensioners, outlining how 
pension reforms, in the context of the continuing recession, are likely to 
affect retirement income of different population groups. 
 
Changes in the Pension System Affecting Women and Men 
of Working Age 
 
State pensions have been made more inclusive for those with periods out 
of the labour market, following the Pensions Act of 2007. Policymakers 
belatedly recognised the injustice to women of receiving only partial 
state pensions due to career breaks to care for children and others 
(Pensions Commission, 2004). Although women’s employment has been 
steadily increasing since the mid-20
th
 century, the gender gap in hours of 
employment persists and employment is particularly low for lone 
mothers (see Figure 1).  
The gender gaps in employment hours and years, as well as in hourly 
pay, are reflected in gender inequality in private pensions. For example, 
at age 56, men’s median private pension wealth in 2006-8 was £52,800, 
women’s £9,100 (Hansard, 2011). Since private pensions make no 
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allowance for time out of the labour market, the substantial gender gap in 
pension income is likely to persist, with especially poor outcomes for 
lone (divorced or never-married) mothers (Ginn & Arber 2002). 
Moreover, the retirement income generated by private pensions will 
become increasingly unpredictable in future, due to developments in 
pension provision that shift investment and annuity risk onto individual 
employees.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of UK women aged 16-64 employed full and part time, 
by partnership status and age of youngest child at home 
 
Note: Mothers aged 16-64. Child living at home 
Source: ONS, 2012.  
 
 
 
Policymakers since the 1980s have used various incentives, in 
addition to tax relief, to promote private pensions. The Labour 
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government elected in 1997 was no exception, setting a target to increase 
the share of private pensions from 40 to 60 per cent of the total pension 
provision (DSS, 1998). Prior to the 1980s, most occupational pension 
schemes were defined benefit (DB), the pension being calculated 
according to a formula based on ‘final salary’ and years of membership 
and the scheme itself bearing the investment risk. Private sector DB 
pension schemes vary widely in quality and specific rules even within a 
single industry (Meyer & Bridgen, 2008). Employers with a DB pension 
scheme have retreated from such provision to limit their liabilities. Most 
have closed the existing scheme to new (or all) members, switching to a 
defined contribution (DC) scheme, in which longevity and investment 
risk are borne by the employees, and raising the pensionable age to 65. 
Some have changed to a cheaper Career Average Earnings formula 
which is fairer to most women, since their age profile of earnings tends to 
be flatter than men’s. However, where employers simultaneously cut 
their contribution, women’s gain is negligible. Remaining private sector 
DB schemes often carry large deficits and some have become insolvent, 
unable to pay the pensions promised. An emergency Financial Assistance 
Scheme provided partial compensation to employees in insolvent 
schemes and the later Pension Protection Fund was set up to insure 
against insolvency. 
Only the public sector of employment, where a high proportion of 
employees are women, retained high quality DB pension schemes but 
these are now under attack from the government, with employees facing 
higher contributions, reduced benefits and later pensionable age (Hutton, 
2011). Indexation of most DB pensions in payment has been changed 
from the Retail Price Index (RPI) to the lower Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), as in the state pension schemes. Use of CPI, insofar as it fails to 
keep pace with inflation, also reduces the value of DB pensions 
preserved during a career break, a change that will disproportionately 
affect women. The financial crisis and recession provide the context in 
which governments have sought to justify reducing the value of public 
sector pensions. 
The pension model most strongly promoted since the 1980s has been 
personal pensions, where the fund accumulated by each individual 
depends on their contributions, investment performance and charges 
levied (ONS, 2011). Retirement income also depends on annuity rates 
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when the fund is converted to an annual amount. By 2009, 7.7million 
workers were members of a DB occupational pension scheme (5.3 
million of them in the public sector); 1 million were contributing to a DC 
occupational scheme and 6.4 million to a personal pension (ONS, 2011). 
Thus a total of 7.4 million workers, having joined pension schemes of the 
type promoted by successive governments, saw their funds and expected 
pensions dramatically reduced by stock market falls associated with the 
2007-8 financial crisis. Despite the poor outlook for these DC pensions 
due to stagnant or falling share prices, the 2008 Pensions Act, with heroic 
optimism, legislated for a new wave of voluntary, but auto-enrolled, 
personal pension schemes, to be introduced from 2012. 
Auto-enrolled personal pensions. Employers lacking a suitable 
alternative workplace pension scheme will be required to auto-enrol 
employees into a DC personal pension scheme that meets regulatory 
requirements, the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) being the 
state-sponsored option. From October 2012, employers with over 50,000 
employees must auto-enrol all those aged over 22 and earning at least 
about £8,000pa (in 2012). Minimum contributions from employer and 
employee (in addition to National Insurance contributions) will 
eventually be 4 per cent from employee, 3 per cent from employer and 1 
per cent tax relief (total 8 per cent). For smaller organisations the start 
date will be delayed for several years, depending on size. Employees will 
be allowed to opt out of their workplace pension scheme. The NEST 
pension account will be portable across jobs but transfers of funds in and 
out will not be allowed. Charges in NEST will initially be 0.3 per cent pa 
of each employee’s accumulated fund, but could rise. Employees will 
also be charged 2 per cent of their annual contribution, to help repay a 
government loan for the start-up costs of the scheme. Policymakers hope 
that around 7 million individuals will contribute to NEST, providing a 
combined pension fund for investment of over £6bn pa. But concerns 
have been raised that since employers may choose the scheme and 
investment, many will shun NEST. Auto-enrolled workers could then 
find their savings eroded in badly-run or fraudulent funds, with annual 
charges over 0.5 per cent of the fund, substantially reducing its value. 
There is also the risk of small pension pots being lost, as workers have an 
average 11 jobs in their working life. 
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Like other private pensions, NEST cannot remove the gender gap in 
retirement income. Indeed, private pensions tend to exacerbate gender 
inequality. Those with earnings below a certain level will be excluded 
from membership. These will be mainly women part-timers, who will 
have no choice but to lose the employer contribution –and the benefit of 
tax relief– for the years when excluded. Tax relief is of greatest benefit to 
employees paying the higher tax rate (40 per cent) who are mainly men; 
half the subsidy is received by the top 25 per cent of taxpayers and a 
quarter by the top 2.5 per cent (Agulnik & Grand 1998). Employers will 
have an incentive to keep part timers’ wages below the auto-enrolment 
threshold, to avoid paying their contribution. Some may illegally 
persuade employees to opt out of any auto-enrolled scheme, for the same 
reason. Among full-timers, some low paid employees are likely to opt 
out due to the cost; a survey by B&CE Benefits Schemes found 28 per 
cent of workers thought they would be unable to afford the 4 per cent 
contribution in addition to paying 12 per cent of qualifying earnings as 
National Insurance (NI) (The Independent, october 25
th
, 2008). Where 
employers previously paid no pension contributions other than NI, they 
are likely to recoup their new compulsory contribution by holding down 
wages of all employees, a double blow for those already excluded by 
their low wages.  
For a proportion of the low paid or modestly-paid employees at whom 
NEST is targeted, voluntary extra saving may not be advisable. There is 
no guarantee that the fund at retirement will exceed the value of 
contributions paid. The potential interaction with means testing in 
retirement, such that additional voluntary saving would bring little or no 
financial gain, will remain as long as the state pension is barely above the 
level of the threshold for means testing. The problem applies especially 
to anyone who will receive less than the full state pension, as well as 
those aged over 45 in 2012, or tenants who would otherwise receive 
Housing Benefit. For women, the risk of a wrong decision is particularly 
high, as unpredictable careers and future relationship status are combined 
with the uncertainties of future investment returns, charges and annuity 
rates. It has been estimated that a median earner saving from age 30 until 
SPA could receive a wage replacement rate of 45 per cent, 30 per cent 
from state pensions and 15 per cent from an auto-enrolled personal 
pension (Pensions Commission, 2005, p. 274). However such estimates 
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are necessarily speculative. For those with gaps in employment, the 
overall replacement rate will be lower (Price, 2007) and for the low paid 
even a replacement rate of 70 per cent would leave them in the 
unattractive position of relying on means tested benefits in retirement. 
Most contributions to personal pensions since the 1980s have been 
minimal and fund values low, with a high proportion of memberships 
lapsing after one year (Waine, 2007). Moreover, as noted above, annuity 
rates have already declined dramatically in the last decade due to 
actuaries’ adjustments to rising estimates of longevity and to low interest 
rates since the financial crash. Rates are expected to decline further in 
future and to be especially low for those with small pension pots, adding 
to the risk of no financial gain from extra saving.  
At the same time as auto-enrolment is introduced, contracting out of 
part of National Insurance (NI) contributions will no longer be allowed 
for any pension schemes. This means the Treasury will gain an extra 
£6bn each year for the NI Fund from the higher NI contributions paid by 
employers and employees. However, the amount of tax relief paid by the 
Treasury to subsidise private pension saving (about £45bn in 2012) will 
increase with auto-enrolment, the bulk of it benefiting the higher paid, 
mainly men. Auto-enrolment will take a large amount of money 
(estimated as £8bn or more each year) out of circulation by reducing 
workers’ disposable income, and will place it in the hands of the same 
banks and insurance companies that created the financial crisis. Given 
this, and all the uncertainties of private pensions, combined with the 
experience of past misselling and fraud, one expert concludes that it is 
‘irresponsible, in the light of recent experience, to entrust [social 
insurance] to private arrangements’ (Rys, 2010, p. 2). The drawbacks of 
private pensions for women and the low paid are clear; hence the 
inclusiveness and level of the state pensions are most important for them. 
 
Changes to State Pensions since 2010 
 
Accelerated Rise in State Pension Age (SPA) 
 
The SPA was already set to equalise for women and men at 65 in 2020, a 
reform that was planned well in advance and was generally accepted. 
However, the Coalition government elected in 2010 decided to accelerate 
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the rise, for both men and women, to age 66 in 2020. Nearly 5 million 
people near to retirement face a later age of eligibility for their state 
pensions than they expected. The rapid change in SPA facing women in 
their late 50s will leave their retirement plans in disarray. About 330,000 
women in their late 50s will have to wait an extra 18 months, with very 
little time to adjust their plans for retirement and for any family caring 
commitments. Some women in their late 50s will lose over £10,000 in 
Basic State Pension compared with women a few months older.  
The ‘active ageing’ agenda of successive governments is welcome 
only if it increases opportunities for older workers who want to stay in 
employment beyond SPA and are able to do so. But it is unhelpful to 
those who cannot work longer for whatever reason. The availability of 
suitable employment for older workers is uncertain and patchy, 
especially in a recession. Nor are older workers necessarily available to 
stay at work. Recent research on the attitudes of those aged 60-64 
identified barriers to longer working and what might encourage 
individuals to work beyond age 65 (Vickerstaff et al., 2008). On the 
whole, older workers had limited desire to work beyond SPA, although 
flexible working, such as part time or casual work, were seen as 
preferable to standard employment. Choice as to timing of retirement 
was limited and unevenly distributed. Although the specific obstacles to 
longer working varied with individuals’ circumstances, common ones 
were the worker’s own poor health or the need to provide informal care 
(ibid). Disabilities affect a significant proportion of men and women 
from age 60, especially among those working in manual occupations. 
The need to provide informal family care is another factor that can 
constrain employment. Women aged 50-69 are twice as likely as men (14 
versus 7 per cent at a given time) to be informal carers of older relatives 
(Arber & Ginn, 1991; 1995) and they are also more likely than men to 
care for grandchildren (Gray, 2005). The austerity cuts in social care 
services will enlarge the ‘caring gap’ that women are expected to fill. Job 
cuts in the public sector will disproportionately affect the availability of 
employment for women, while gendered age discrimination among some 
employers further reduces opportunities to work longer (Itzin & 
Phillipson, 1993; Loretto & Vickerstaff, 2010; McKay, 2010). Thus 
raising the SPA will disproportionately affect women and manual 
workers.  
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Planned State Pension Reform – the Single Tier Pension (STP) 
 
In early 2013, the government produced detailed proposals for a new 
Single Tier Pension (STP) that will combine the flat rate basic state 
pension (BSP) and the earnings-related state second pension (S2P) into a 
flat rate single-tier pension of £144 per week (at 2013 prices) if payable 
in full. When introduced, after 2016, it is proposed that the STP will 
include the self-employed and be indexed in payment through the triple 
lock –the highest of CPI, average earnings rise or 2.5 per cent. The full 
amount will be paid at SPA to those with 35 years contributions or 
credits, pro rata for those with fewer years, and a minimum requirement 
of 7-10 years (still not decided). A great advantage of STP is that it is 
simpler to understand and to operate than the two-tier structure. During 
the transition to the new STP, the need for means tested Pension Credit 
should be reduced and all derived benefits in the state pensions (spousal, 
survivor and divorcee) will be phased out. 
Women with low lifetime earnings would in principle be the major 
beneficiaries of the STP, if partnered and thereby ineligible for means 
tested Pension Credit. However, the STP is to be set very low, at about 
25 per cent of average wages; the amount is well below the 
internationally-accepted poverty level of 60 per cent of median 
population income. Because of the low level, by 2050 over 40 per cent of 
pensioner households are still expected to be eligible for means tested 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit (Carrera et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the requirement of 35 years of NI contributions or credits for 
full STP (when only 30 years were required for the basic pension) is a 
step backwards for women with interrupted employment. Some will 
receive only a partial STP.  
Some men and women, those who would otherwise have been able to 
accrue state pension entitlements above £144 per week (in 2013 terms) 
through S2P, will be worse off with STP than under the existing two-tier 
state pensions. The vital protection of a wage replacement provided for 
carers with gaps in employment in the state earnings-related schemes 
(SERPs and S2P) will be lost. The only means of obtaining a wage 
replacement will be through private pensions, where women’s time out 
for family caring places them at a disadvantage. With the exception of 
Ireland, the UK’s existing state pensions provide the lowest wage 
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replacement rate across 27 OECD countries – only 35 per cent compared 
with the average 61 per cent, for a full career on average earnings 
(Queisser & Whitehouse, 2006) and the full STP provides ten per cent 
less than existing state pensions. Because the STP will be barely above 
Pension Credit level, women with less than 35 qualifying years will still 
be at risk of falling below that threshold and may therefore gain little or 
nothing financially from any extra saving, for example in voluntary auto-
enrolled personal pensions. This risk is more acute for women than men, 
since life-course events such as unexpected caring responsibilities and 
changes in marital or partnership status can dramatically alter their ability 
to accrue pensions. For policymakers and private pension providers, the 
main purpose of STP is to reduce, for low to moderate earners, the 
disincentive to extra voluntary saving that is posed by the risk of 
interaction with means testing. Yet STP’s low level, combined with only 
partial receipt among a proportion of women, could undermine that aim.  
The pension reforms and cuts to jobs, services and benefits promise a 
bleak future for both current and future pensioners, with the hardest hit 
being the most vulnerable groups, especially women whose lifetime 
earnings have been restricted by their family caring. I next return to the 
question of the fairness of austerity measures.  
 
Are Austerity Measures Fairly Distributed? 
 
The Coalition government claimed that ‘We are all in this together’ and 
that the ongoing cuts in living standards were distributed fairly across the 
population. However, recent research by the Commission on Living 
Standards estimated that whereas the real income of the highest paid will 
actually rise in real terms between 2008 and 2020, an average household 
will see a decline of 3 per cent and a typical low-income household will 
see their income fall by 15 per cent (Plunkett, 2012). Income inequality 
in the UK has been rising since the 1980s and has continued through the 
financial crisis and recession. Table 1 has shown the uneven effect on 
different family types, with lone women pensioners and lone mothers 
among the hardest hit by the cuts.  
Another claim is that older people have been largely protected from 
the cuts and that they have enjoyed ‘undue advantage…at the expense of 
the young’ (Intergenerational Foundation, 2012, p. 1). Older people are 
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often portrayed as a burden on society and are told they must work for 
longer, yet at the same time are blamed for lack of jobs for young people 
(ibid). Yet as the evidence above shows, most older people are far from 
well-off and about a quarter are in poverty according to the widely-
accepted OECD definition. All older people face further cuts in living 
standards and local services but the cuts mainly affect the most 
vulnerable pensioners, those with disabilities requiring social care and 
living alone or on a low income. It is often forgotten that society benefits 
from the value of older people’s informal caring – for spouses, for their 
own parents and for grandchildren, a contribution estimated as worth £34 
billion each year (McNabb, 2012). If the various taxes paid by older 
people and the cost savings to the state from the informal care and 
voluntary work pensioners provide are included, the total benefit to 
society from older people has been calculated as £175.8bn every year, 
compared to total expenditure on older people through pensions, welfare 
payments and health care of £136.2bn. The annual net contribution by 
older people to the economy is therefore almost £40bn (NPC, 2012). 
Undoubtedly, young people in Britain face a grim future in terms of 
finding jobs in a prolonged recession, and the anger of disaffected urban 
youth at rising inequality and social exclusion played a part in the 
‘Occupy’ movement and the widespread riots of 2011. But to cast 
intergenerational relations as a zero-sum game with old and young 
competing for resources, as the Intergenerational Foundation does, is ill-
conceived. Not only do families bind generations together in 
interdependence but in the UK young and old campaign in solidarity, for 
example in a ‘Generations United’ initiative to defend the welfare state 
and public services. Within-generation inequalities in later life, especially 
of gender and class, outweigh any putative intergenerational inequalities.  
 
Are Austerity Measures Effective? 
 
In the UK, the three-party consensus that cuts in public spending can 
reduce the annual deficit has been challenged. Since 2009, an informal 
alliance of policy analysts, economists, tax experts, trade unions and left 
political groupings have made a persuasive case that austerity is both 
unjust and counterproductive. They argue that, since the deficit arose 
from transferring bank debts to the state, it is unfair to attempt to recoup 
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those debts from working people and pensioners –the 99 per cent. 
Moreover, they point out that austerity measures applied during recession 
tend to worsen the economic situation and increase the deficit; UK 
growth is stagnant and living standards are still falling, several years after 
the financial crash (Reed & Lawson, 2011; PCS, 2011). According to the 
TUC, in 2011 ‘slow growth cost £34bn more in tax credits and social 
security costs and lost over £51bn of income tax’ (TUC, 2012, p. 7) 
increasing the deficit. Figures from the Office for National Statistics 
show that net income per head in 2012 was 13 per cent lower than in 
2008, after allowing for inflation (BBC, 2012). Auto-enrolment into new 
personal pensions will also reduce the population’s spending power and 
prolong recession. 
A recent report has highlighted the steep rise in UK income inequality 
over the course of a generation, the Gini coefficient rising from 2.5 in 
1979 to 3.5 by 1999. The report notes that ‘Since the mid 1970s, the 
general workforce’s share of GDP had shrunk by over 12 per cent up to 
2008’ and that while the average pay of an employee in a FTSE100 
company rose by 2.7 per cent in 2011, executive pay rose by 49 per cent 
(High Pay Commission, 2012, p. 9). This report identified the detrimental 
effects on society of growing inequality and also made the business case 
for restoring more income equality through fairer pay structures that are 
accountable and transparent. Austerity policies are increasingly exposed 
as leading only to further hardship and blighting a generation of young 
people with little chance of employment.  The scale of the perceived 
social injustice has inspired a Coalition of Resistance, with marches, 
rallies and occupations.  
Not everyone suffers from austerity of course. Banks are still paying 
large bonuses in addition to exceedingly high salaries and the social elite 
is unaffected by cuts in public services since members can afford private 
education, healthcare and social care. In the UK Cabinet, there are over 
20 millionaires. Austerity policies are consistent with the ideology of the 
three major political parties, all of which to some degree share the aim to 
shrink the state and expand the private sector. Their mantra is ‘personal 
responsibility’, implying that those who are poor have brought their 
situation on themselves. They ignore the fact that it is mainly women 
who, through a sense of personal responsibility for their families, have 
the lowest incomes both during working life and in later life. 
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Alternatives to Restore Economic Stability and Prosperity 
 
Critics of austerity policies advocate investing in infrastructure that will 
create new jobs and provide benefits to the public and the economy in the 
long term. For example, investing in building affordable homes and 
renewable energy would both stimulate economic activity and generate 
revenue (Irvin et al., 2009; Reed & Lawson, 2011). In order to fund this 
investment, possible ways to save public money and to increase tax 
revenue from those with the highest incomes have been suggested (see 
Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: 
Raising extra revenue and saving costs 
__________________________________________________________ 
Reforms               (£ billion pa) 
 
1. Increasing revenue: 
Apply 50% tax on incomes over £100,000pa         2.3 
Set minimum income tax bands on incomes over £100,000pa  14.9 
(to claw back tax allowances and tax reliefs)    
Remove cap on National Insurance contributions        9.1 
Abolish tax havens and tax allowances for the ‘non-domiciled’  10.0 
Introduce a financial transaction tax           4.2 
Total annual extra tax revenue          40.5 
     
2. Saving costs: 
Scrap planned ID cards                 2.5 
Scrap new weapons programmes             4.0 
End military spending on Afghan war           4.0 
Scrap plan for ‘mini-Titan’ new prisons          1.3 
Switch PFI schemes back to the public sector          3.3 
Total annual cost savings            15.1 
 
Total extra revenue and savings          55.6 
__________________________________________________________ 
Source: Irvin et al. (2009). Based on their Table 1 and section 5. 
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Thus £56bn of extra revenue and savings could be found and used for 
two purposes: first, to stimulate the economy through investment in jobs 
(which in turn will increase revenue and reduce spending on 
unemployment benefits) and second to reduce the annual deficit (about 
£40bn in 2009) (Irvin et al., 2009). The highly regressive tax relief on 
private pensions could be reduced or removed, providing resources to 
improve state pensions. The annual windfall of higher National Insurance 
contributions due to the ending of contracting out belongs to the NI Fund 
and as such should be used to improve social security benefits. 
The government accepts the need for some reforms to banking to 
improve stability, including some separation of the retail and investment 
functions of banks. However, critics argue this is not enough, proposing a 
state-owned People’s Bank for everyday retail transactions, providing 
current accounts with the security that most people require (Reed & 
Lawson, 2011). More radically, some economists have proposed 
monetary reform, in which full reserve banking would be mandatory 
(prohibiting private banks from creating money through loans not backed 
by their own reserves or deposits in customers’ investment accounts). 
The right to create new money, as and when required, would be restored 
to the state, through the Bank of England (Dyson et al., 2011; Jackson & 
Dyson, 2012). This option would, however, not be possible for countries 
without their own national currency. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Austerity is not working in the UK, nor in other countries crippled by 
debts arising from irresponsible activity in the financial sector as well as 
governments’ reluctance to apply effective regulation to banking and 
their decision to bail out the banks. While the cuts in jobs, services, 
pensions and benefits fall hardest on lone mothers and lone female 
pensioners, a tiny elite of top earners continue to increase their already 
high income, giving rise to a widespread sense of injustice among the 
99% of the population; this label was adopted by the Occupy and UK 
Uncut protesters, to highlight the extreme and growing inequality of 
income, wealth and political power. Alternative economic and social 
policies are available to reduce inequality and poverty, and to restore 
high quality public services, given the political will. 
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There is no evidence that older and younger people see their interests 
as being in conflict; rather there are intergenerational campaigns to 
defend the universality and security of the welfare state. The UK policy 
direction since the 1980s –to reduce the role of the state and boost that of 
the private sector– is endorsed by all three major political parties, 
depriving the electorate of a choice in this matter. Such policy aims 
represent a longstanding neo-liberal project that has no popular mandate; 
but the financial crisis and recession can be seen as providing a 
convenient legitimation. Nevertheless, the claim that ‘There Is No 
Alternative’ to cuts in public spending is vigorously contested by 
evidence, argument, popular organisation and civil unrest, wherever 
people are suffering from the unequal impact of austerity policies.  
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